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Low- and middle-income countries 
A B S T R A C T   
Pay for performance (P4P) programmes are popular health system-focused interventions aiming to improve 
health outcomes in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs). This realist review aims to understand how, why 
and under what circumstance P4P works in LMICs.We systematically searched peer-reviewed and grey literature 
databases, and examined the mechanisms underpinning P4P effects on: utilisation of services, patient satisfac-
tion, provider productivity and broader health system, and contextual factors moderating these. This evidence 
was then used to construct a causal loop diagram.We included 112 records (19 grey literature; 93 peer-reviewed 
articles) assessing P4P schemes in 36 countries. Although we found mixed evidence of P4P’s effects on identified 
outcomes, common pathways to improved outcomes include: community outreach; adherence to clinical 
guidelines, patient-provider interactions, patient trust, facility improvements, access to drugs and equipment, 
facility autonomy, and lower user fees. Contextual factors shaping the system response to P4P include: degree of 
facility autonomy, efficiency of banking, role of user charges in financing public services; staffing levels; staff 
training and motivation, quality of facility infrastructure and community social norms. Programme design fea-
tures supporting or impeding health system effects of P4P included: scope of incentivised indicators, fairness and 
reach of incentives, timely payments and a supportive, robust verification system that does not overburden staff. 
Facility bonuses are a key element of P4P, but rely on provider autonomy for maximum effect. If health system 
inputs are vastly underperforming pre-P4P, they are unlikely to improve only due to P4P. This is the first realist 
review describing how and why P4P initiatives work (or fail) in different LMIC contexts by exploring the un-
derlying mechanisms and contextual and programme design moderators. Future studies should systematically 
examine health system pathways to outcomes for P4P and other health system strengthening initiatives, and offer 
more understanding of how programme design shapes mechanisms and effects.   
1. Introduction 
Pay-for-performance (P4P), or the provision of financial incentives to 
healthcare providers based on pre-specified performance targets, is an 
approach with substantial variation in its design and implementation 
that has been adopted in numerous low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs) with the aim of increasing service coverage (Renmans et al., 
2016, 2017). In these settings, P4P often involves a package of reforms 
in addition to the financial incentives, including, for example, a shift to 
electronic health information systems, a new system of performance and 
data verification, and increased financial decentralisation. Moreover, 
P4P has recently been coupled as a key ‘entry point’ for strategic pur-
chasing with the explicit aim to strengthen LMIC health systems toward 
the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 3.8 for Universal 
Health Coverage (Mathauer et al., 2017). However, there is little evi-
dence on how P4P affects health systems as a whole (Borghi et al., 2018). 
Existing systematic reviews largely examine the effectiveness of P4P 
initiatives in relation to performance outcomes rather than focusing on 
the mechanisms from which these outcomes have been delivered or how 
various programme and contextual factors moderate that delivery. For 
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example, a systematic review of the effect of P4P programmes in LMIC 
reported that the evidence base was too limited to draw broad conclu-
sions and that greater understanding of how incentive design impacts 
programme effectiveness was needed (Witter et al., 2012). More recent 
reviews of P4P effects on quality of care (Das et al., 2016) and on HIV 
indicators (Suthar et al., 2017) reported programme effects only in 
relation to these outcomes. One review focused on extracting policy 
recommendations from studies documenting the effects of P4P on the 
health system, but it did not explore the mechanisms underpinning these 
effects nor their contextual variation (Renmans et al., 2016). Despite 
some emerging evidence of the health system effects of P4P, the tradi-
tional focus within P4P systematic reviews and empirical research re-
mains on programme outcomes, and there remains a considerable 
evidence gap about how P4P works, under what conditions, as well as 
what P4P processes best support health systems strengthening (Roland, 
2012; Epstein, 2012; Ssengooba et al., 2012). 
In response, our study, following Pawson and colleagues (Pawson, 
2006; Pawson et al., 2005), is the first systematic realist review to assess 
the effects of P4P on health system inputs, focusing on financing, 
governance, medical commodities and human resources. This review 
aims to better investigate causal pathways to outcomes, thus helping to 
determine the ‘active ingredients’ of P4P programmes (e.g. by identi-
fying which health system levers i.e. drugs, workforce, etc. that P4P 
affects), and if and how these vary by setting in LMICs. A realist 
approach enables the inclusion and synthesis of a much broader set of 
evidence than systematic reviews, including qualitative methods which 
are specifically designed to address ‘how and why’ questions(4). Unlike 
experimental and quasi-experimental studies, which are a mainstay of 
P4P systematic reviews, a realist approach assumes that complex in-
terventions do not operate in isolation. Instead, realist approaches 
recognise that these interventions function within complex social sys-
tems, and go through numerous iterations including design, imple-
mentation and evaluation, during which time the intervention interacts 
with people, hierarchies, socio-cultural structures, and other factors, 
which are rarely linear nor result in the same outcomes in different 
Table 1 
Methodology for completing the systematic realist review (Molnar et al., 2015).   
Steps Task(s) 
1 Develop initial programme 
theory 
• Search for initial theories 
• Consult with experts 
2 Search strategy Search electronic peer-reviewed and grey 
literature databases using keywords and 
Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) terms 
3 Select and appraise 
documents 
• Use inclusion and exclusion criteria to screen 
for relevant abstracts, articles and reports 
• Retrieve full-text of articles and reports 
4 Extract data • Use standardised Excel tool to extract 
relevant data 
• Search reference lists by hand for additional 
potentially relevant articles and reports 
5 Analysis and synthesis 
process 
• Analyse data for content and outcome 
patterns; and synthesise mechanisms 
6 Present and disseminate 
revised programme theory 
• Present and refine revised theoretical 
findings with relevant stakeholders and 
experts.  
Fig. 1. Initial programme theory explaining the causal pathways of the health systems effects of payment for performance programmes. Source: Borghi et al., 2018; 
adapted from Anselmi et al., 2017b. 
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contexts (Pawson et al., 2005). A realist approach is initially guided by a 
programme theory of how the programme leads to given outcomes and 
in what context. This is referred to as a context-mechanism-outcome 
configuration — CMO. A realist approach seeks to empirically test the 
hypothesised ‘mechanisms’ and expected behavioural responses to the 
P4P programme, and how these are contextually moderated during 
programme implementation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Julnes and Mark, 
1998). These results are then tested against CMO configuration(s) to 
determine the most credible explanation(s) of observed outcomes. This 
resulting CMO configuration is then compared with the initial pro-
gramme theory, which is modified in light of these findings, resulting in 
a ‘middle range’ programme theory, which can be generalised across 
LMIC settings (Pawson et al., 2004, 2005). 
The overall aim of this realist review is to help researchers and policy 
makers understand how and why P4P programmes implemented in 
LMICs result in intended or unintended outcomes and how the context 
within which they are implemented affects this. Specifically, the 
following three research questions guided the review:  
1. What are the health system effects of P4P in LMICs? 
2. What were the identified contextual factors and mechanisms influ-
encing the outcomes?  
3. How and why do the contextual factors affect the outcomes? 
2. Methods 
2.1. Study design 
The study was conducted in six steps, as described in detail by Borghi 
et al. (2018) and summarised in Table 1 and below. According to 
Pawson’s proposed methodology for realist reviews, our research was 
not linear, but iterative (Pawson, 2006). This review adopts the Realist 
and Meta-narrative Evidence Syntheses Evolving Standards (RAMESES) 
as developed by Wong et al. (2013). 
2.2. Step 1 – develop an initial programme theory 
The initial programme theory was based on relevant P4P theories of 
change presented in the World Bank’s P4P impact evaluation toolkit 
(Vermeersch et al., 2012) and a P4P study in Tanzania (Anselmi et al., 
2017a), as well as theories of change developed during an international 
workshop on the health system effects of P4P in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
in November 2015 and a Researcher Links UK-Mexico workshop in April 
2015. The initial programme theory was presented to a policy and ac-
ademic audience at the Fourth Global Forum for Human Resources in 
Health in November 2017 for external validation. The programme the-
ory was revisited throughout the evidence review process, and revised to 
reflect emerging findings. Our programme theory was also discussed and 
validated with P4P experts. 
Based on existing perceptions of P4P, Fig. 1 illustrates how P4P is 
generally understood and assumed to affect the health system and lead 
to outcome changes, and is described in detail by Borghi et al. (2018). 
Health workers respond to financial incentives by becoming more 
motivated to deliver incentivised care, e.g. through better adherence to 
clinical guidelines and by adopting strategies to achieve incentivised 
targets (Meessen et al., 2007a; Gertler et al., 2011; Eijkenaar et al., 
2013). As a result of additional funds from meeting incentivised targets, 
health services become more affordable (by reducing or eliminating 
informal charges) and responsive to community and patient needs. P4P 
also involves verification of performance data by supervisors, 
strengthening relations between providers and their managers, which 
may enhance the governance function of the system through more 
frequent and focused supportive supervision, and can facilitate resource 
prioritisation to meet targets (Borghi et al., 2013), as well as reduced 
absenteeism and improved staffing levels and composition. Incentives 
provided to managers further strengthen links between levels of the 
system. Financial rewards for meeting targets may be invested in 
improving facility infrastructure and drug supply, which impacts on 
facility resource levels. In turn, this improves the work environment 
enhancing worker motivation to deliver better and more affordable 
services, increasing patient demand. There are a number of ways in 
which P4P is hypothesised to influence quality of care within the theory 
of change, in terms of structural quality (improved infrastructure, and 
drug availability), process quality (improved patient-provider in-
teractions; adherence to clinical protocols); and outcomes (improved 
patient satisfaction). However, P4P can also result in unintended con-
sequences such as mis-reporting performance (gaming), a displacement 
of effort away from un-incentivised services, and positive spillover ef-
fects (Binyaruka et al., 2015a; Turcotte-Tremblay et al., 2020). 
2.3. Step 2 – search strategy 
The scoping review was conducted using the Medline, Embase, and 
EconLit databases to address the research questions. Additionally, as 
grey literature is a relevant source of information for both P4P and 
realist reviews, evaluation reports or policy documents published by 
LMIC governments, international organisations, non-governmental or-
ganisations and consultancy firms were also included by searching 
Google Scholar, Emerald Insight, and websites of key stakeholders 
including: World Bank, WHO, Cordaid, Norad, DfID, USAID and 
PEPFAR. 
Search terms related to P4P, LMICs and health systems pillars were 
combined in the search strategy and were first developed for Medline 
and then adapted to the other databases (Supplementary File 1). The 
search period covered January 1, 1995 to March 1, 2019. The relevance 
of retrieved articles was assessed according to the inclusion and exclu-
sion criteria outlined below. 
In order to be included, the evidence had to meet the following 
criteria: (i) the exposure (intervention) was a P4P intervention targeting 
providers with financial incentives varying according to the achieve-
ment of quantitative health service delivery targets and/or quality of 
care targets. When performance was linked to quantitative outputs, it 
was related to “selected healthcare services” as such criterion enabled 
discrimination between P4P and fee-for-service (FFS) mechanisms; (ii) 
the study isolated (or attempted to isolate) the effects of P4P policies 
from broader policy reforms; (iii) incentives were allocated to public 
and/or non-public providers or institutions at primary, secondary or 
tertiary levels; and/or managers and administrators; (iv) pilot projects 
were included in the study; (v) the study outcome was either a quanti-
tative or qualitative measure (or both) of the impact of the P4P initiative 
on one or more health system functions described in the programme 
theory (Fig. 1); (vi) the papers reported studies that either collected or 
intended to collect primary data. Where the papers referred to a 
different source of evidence for primary data (e.g. in the case of sys-
tematic reviews), the primary source of information was retrieved and 
explored; and (vii) the intervention was implemented in an LMIC, as 
defined by the World Bank (2015). 
The review excluded documents: (i) which were evaluations of the 
“potential” implementation of P4P strategies not yet in place; (ii) which 
only measured health outcomes; and (iii) published in a language other 
than English, French and Spanish. 
Reference lists of all publications included in the final review were 
explored for additional relevant literature. We also consulted P4P ex-
perts to identify additional relevant literature. The literature review 
search ended at the point of saturation when the research yielded no 
further new sources of information. References were compiled in 
Endnote X9 software. 
2.4. Step 3 – selecting and appraising documents 
The identification and selection of studies in this review was based 
on relevance and rigour, and their study’s ability to enrich the C-M-O 
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configuration underlying the programme theory (Fig. 1) (Pawson, 
2006). Accordingly, literature was reviewed to examine whether the 
programme theory (Fig. 1) was born out by evidence, and to identify 
knowledge gaps where evidence was weak. Where there was conflicting 
evidence on a given component, we explored contextual and scheme 
design differences that may account for differences in findings. 
2.5. Step 4 – extracting data 
Data were extracted and recorded in an Excel database. Initially data 
extraction focused on research objectives, sample size, and study sub-
jects. Next, data were extracted to understand how, why and under what 
circumstances P4P effects health system pillars. Finally, all data were 
indexed and linked to relevant program theory as described in Fig. 1. 
Additionally, we appraised study quality of included articles. Quality 
criteria differ for qualitative and quantitative methods, because of their 
differing underlying assumptions, methodologies and aims. New tools 
have been developed for systematic reviews which include both quali-
tative and quantitative studies or mixed methods studies. The Mixed 
Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT) was chosen for this review because it 
can be used quickly and reliably and includes items appraising (Ren-
mans et al., 2017) qualitative methods (Renmans et al., 2016), quanti-
tative methods, and (Mathauer et al., 2017) mixed methods (i.e., the 
approach to combining qualitative and quantitative components) (Hong 
et al., 2018). Six subset of Items are worded to reflect good quality and 
each study is rated as “yes,” “no,” or “cannot tell” for each applicable 
item. Because the MMAT items reflect quality of reporting as well as 
quality of study design, no attempt was made to obtain further details 
about the studies under review by contacting authors. 
The first and second author familiarised themselves with the MMAT 
by studying the tutorial before applying the MMAT to the included 
literature. The mixed methods design and the design of each qualitative 
and quantitative component was also recorded, using the definitions 
supplied on the MMAT. All ratings were entered into an Excel spread-
sheet and used to calculate the proportion of studies meeting each 
quality criteria. 
2.6. Step 5 – analysing and synthesising data 
Articles were screened by three study team members. Each study was 
read and synthesised by the first author. The second author carefully 
read papers and assessed if the evidence was used properly in the syn-
thesis. The first author discussed with the study team to assess whether 
emerging findings supported, refuted or reinterpreted the initial pro-
gramme theory (Fig. 1). By doing so, the authors critically appraised the 
contribution of each study to the initial theory, as well as synthesised 
across findings. The next refined theory, defined as a middle-range 
theory (Pawson et al., 2005), was finalised to highlight the links be-
tween contextual factors, mechanisms and outcomes of P4P in-
terventions. The final synthesis was agreed upon by all authors. 
2.7. Step 6 – presenting and disseminating revised programme theory 
Finally, we presented and further refined our revised theoretical 
findings in the middle-range theory with relevant stakeholders and ex-
perts including at the Fifth Global Symposium on Health Systems 
Research in October 2018 and at a P4P all partners workshop in Maputo, 
Mozambique in March 2019. We present our final revised programme 
theory as a causal loop diagram (CLD) (Fig. 2), because the mechanisms 
for how P4P alters patient and provider behaviour, and the contextual 
factors that contribute to the success of the initiative identified in the 
realist review could not be adequately represented using a linear 
Fig. 2. Programme theory visualised as a causal loop diagram.  
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Fig. 3. Detailed views of the programme theory visualised as a causal loop diagram: (A) Demand- and supply-side mechanisms through which P4P programmes 
affect utilisation of health services in LMIC (community outreach - R4, provider effort - R3, R4, patient trust - R3, R4); (B) Demand- and supply-side mechanisms 
through which P4P programmes affect utilisation of health services in LMICs (health worker adherence to clinical guidelines - R8, R9, quality of care - R5, R9, user 
fees - R5). Mechanisms through which P4P programmes influence patient satisfaction in LMICs (facility improvements - R12, user fees R5). Mechanisms through 
which P4P programmes influence healthcare providers and the broader health system (provider motivation - R2, R8); (C) Demand- and supply-side mechanisms 
through which P4P programmes affect utilisation of health services in LMICs (quality of care - R6, R7, provider effort - R6, R7, R10, B2). Mechanisms through which 
P4P programmes influence patient satisfaction in LMICs (increased availability of services - R7, provider responsiveness - R6, R7). Mechanisms through which P4P 
programmes influence healthcare providers and the broader health system (spill-overs on non-incentivised activities - R1); (D) Mechanisms through which P4P 
programmes influence healthcare providers and the broader health system (misreporting of information - R11, B1). 
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diagram. CLDs can be used to provide a blueprint for complex systems, e. 
g. health systems (Chang et al., 2017; Cassidy et al., 2019), representing 
important, non-linear feedback and relationships that further our un-
derstanding of how these systems operate (Sterman, 2000). CLDs use 
arrows with polarity to indicate causal influences between variables; 
health workers that were awarded incentives felt motivated to achieve 
targets (positive causal link), an increase in user fees resulted in reduced 
patient satisfaction in delivery of healthcare (negative causal link). 
Supplementary file 2 provides detailed guidance on how to read a 
CLD. We represented delays in influence by two dashed lines across an 
arrow, e.g. community outreach, over time, resulted in increased trust 
between patients and providers (Fig. 2). Feedback loops are represented 
by numbered circular arrows and show either reinforcing (R) or 
balancing (B) behaviour. Health workers who were awarded incentives 
felt motivated to achieve targets and consequently adhered to clinical 
guidelines (captured in loop R8, Fig. 2) is an example of a reinforcing 
Fig. 3. (continued). 
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loop, exhibiting amplified, spiralling feedback. Loop B1 (Fig. 2) de-
scribes how an increase in provider motivation may also have resulted in 
providers retaining drugs to avoid stockouts (an incentivised target), 
thus reducing the availability of drugs for patients; the negative causal 
link here provides a dampening effect and stops the loop spiralling 
indefinitely. 
The CLD shows mechanisms and mediators of programme effect that 
were identified in the original theory of change (grey arrows and vari-
ables), identified in the realist review but not in the original theory of 
change (black) and were captured in both the original theory of change 
and the review (green). Key mediators or contextual factors of pro-
gramme effect that are not part of a causal loop are shown as notes (N) in 
the diagram (e.g. N1, Fig. 2). 
3. Results 
3.1. Study characteristics and design 
We identified 38,234 records and screened 374 papers for the full- 
text review (Fig. 4). Finally, 117 records ((Ssengooba et al., 2012), 
(Anselmi et al., 2017a), (Engineer et al., 2016; Berman, 2015; Celhay 
et al., 2015; Gertler and Giovagnoli, 2014; Rubinstein et al., 2009; 
Rahman et al., 2017; Rob and Alam, 2013; Bowser et al., 2013; Antony 
et al., 2017; Lagarde et al., 2015; Bertone and Meessen, 2013), (Bonfrer 
et al., 2014a, 2014b; Falisse et al., 2012, 2015; Rudasingwa et al., 2015; 
Ir et al., 2015; Jacobs et al., 2010; Khim et al., 2018; Matsuoka et al., 
2014; Van de Poel et al., 2016), (De Walque et al., 2017; Zang et al., 
2015; Ding et al., 2013; Fan, 2017; Li et al., 1982; Liu and Mills, 2005; 
Millar et al., 2017a; Powell-Jackson et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2016; Wang 
et al., 2011), (Wu, 2014; Yao et al., 2008; Yip and Eggleston, 2001; Yip 
et al., 2010, 2014; Zhang et al., 2017a; Cercone et al., 2005; Hindle and 
Kalanj, 2004; Fox et al., 2014; Huillery and Seban, 2017), (Soeters et al., 
2011a; Zeng et al., 2013, 2018; Bernal et al., 2018; Mohanan et al., 
2019; Singh and Masters, 2017; Chernichovsky and Bayulken, 1995; 
Aryankhesal et al., 2013, 2015; Sarikhani and Lankarani, 2013), (Menya 
et al., 2015; Saleh et al., 2013; Morgan, 2011; Lohmann et al., 2017; 
McMahon and De Allegri, 2016; McMahon et al., 2016, 2018; Wilhelm 
et al., 2016; Schuster et al., 2016, 2018), (Barnes et al., 2014; Duysburgh 
et al., 2016; Ye et al., 2014; Regalía and Castro, 2007; Bhatnagar and 
George, 2016; Ogundeji et al., 2016; Witter et al., 2011; Peabody et al., 
2011, 2014, 2017), (Wagner et al., 2018; Basinga, 2009; Basinga et al., 
2010, 2011; de Walque et al., 2015; Gertler and Vermeersch, 2012; 
Janssen et al., 2015; Kalk et al., 2010; Kantengwa et al., 2010; Lannes, 
2015; Lannes et al., 2016; Meessen et al., 2006, 2007b; Ngo et al., 2017; 
Priedeman Skiles et al., 2012; Rusa et al., 2009; Shapira et al., 2017; 
Sherry et al., 2017; Skiles et al., 2015; Bertone et al., 2016), (Bertone and 
Witter, 2015; Binyaruka and Borghi, 2017; Binyaruka et al., 2015b, 
2018a; Borghi et al., 2015; Chimhutu et al., 2014, 2015, 2016; Mayu-
mana et al., 2017a; Olafsdottir et al., 2014), (Songstad et al., 2012; 
Gormus, 2015; Miller et al., 2014; Chansa et al., 2015; Friedman et al., 
2016; Shen et al., 2017; Vergeer and Chansa, 2008; Feldacker et al., 
2017; World Bank. Rewarding Pro, 2016; Bodson et al., 2018; Paul et al., 
2018; Paul et al., 2014; Turcotte-Tremblay et al., 2018; Turcotte--
Tremblay et al., 2017)) met the inclusion criteria comprising of 19 grey 
literature and 98 peer-reviewed articles. The included studies assessed 
P4P schemes in 36 countries, across Sub-Saharan Africa (n = 23 coun-
tries), Latin America and the Caribbean (n = 6 countries), East Asia and 
the Pacific (n = 4 countries), South Asia (n = 4 countries), the Middle 
East and North Africa (n = 2 countries), and Europe and Central Asia (n 
= 2 countries) (Fig. 5). Study designs comprised of 54 quantitative 
Fig. 4. Selection process for review on the health system effects of pay for performance interventions in low- and middle-income settings.  
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impact evaluations (39 quasi-experimental studies, 15 randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs)), 33 qualitative studies, 10 observational 
studies, 15 mixed methods studies, 1 study protocol, and 2 reviews. 
Supplementary file 3 presents key characteristics of the included studies. 
3.2. Study quality 
The MMAT results suggest that the mixed methods studies were 
generally of good quality (Supplementary file 4). In the majority of 
studies, the mixed methods design was relevant to the research ques-
tions and the qualitative and quantitative components were integrated 
at some stage to address the research question. However, none of studies 
acknowledged or reflected on the limitations associated with the inte-
gration of qualitative and quantitative data (or results) relevant to 
address the research question. 
Quantitative RCT components scored high: all but one RCTs (n = 7) 
reported complete outcome data and all RCTs (n = 8) clearly described 
appropriate randomisation. However, the majority of RCTs (n = 7) did 
not clearly describe allocation concealment procedures. Non- 
randomised quantitative components were of high quality, particularly 
regarding the validity of measurements and the use of recruitment 
procedures to minimise selection bias. A majority of quantitative non- 
randomised components reported baseline comparisons between 
groups and controlled for relevant confounders, and used appropriate 
and valid measurements. Common weaknesses were identified in the 
qualitative components, including not giving appropriate consideration 
to the impact of the researchers or the wider context on the methods/ 
findings. The frequency of “cannot tell” ratings for the qualitative 
components was also particularly high, e.g. there was often insufficient 
detail to evaluate data analysis procedures. 
3.3. Context–mechanism-outcome configurations 
This section presents findings on the potential health system effects 
of P4P programmes in LMICs and how context affects the mechanisms 
through which outcomes are achieved (i.e. C-M-O configurations). We 
focus on the outcomes highlighted in the initial programme theory: 1) 
utilisation of healthcare services; 2) patient satisfaction; and 3) P4P’s 
impact on healthcare providers as well as the broader health system. 
Findings from included studies were used to refine the initial pro-
gramme theory, with the final revised programme theory presented in 
Fig. 2. Detailed views of the revised programme theory are presented in 
Fig. 3, in which loops have been predominantly grouped to describe 
behaviour around a common outcome. 
3.4. P4P and the utilisation of health services 
We found 32 studies reporting data on the effect of P4P programmes 
on the utilisation of healthcare services, of which 19 studies showed 
significant positive effects on at least one indicator (Anselmi et al., 
2017a; Berman, 2015; Celhay et al., 2015; Gertler and Giovagnoli, 2014; 
Rahman et al., 2017; Rob and Alam, 2013; Jacobs et al., 2010; Matsuoka 
et al., 2014; Liu and Mills, 2005; Zhang et al., 2017a; Soeters et al., 
2011a; Zeng et al., 2013; Regalía and Castro, 2007; Basinga, 2009; 
Basinga et al., 2011; Basinga et al., 2010; de Walque et al., 2015; Sherry 
et al., 2017; Binyaruka et al., 2015b; Soeters et al., 2011b; Singh et al., 
2015), six studies reported non-significant effects on the utilisation of 
healthcare services (Engineer et al., 2016; Falisse et al., 2015; De Wal-
que et al., 2017; Powell-Jackson et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2011; Skiles 
et al., 2015), and a further six studies whose design did not allow for the 
interpretation of positive or negative effects or correlations (Meessen 
et al., 2007a; Morgan, 2011; Schuster et al., 2016; Witter et al., 2011; 
Janssen et al., 2015; Meessen et al., 2006). Studies examined a range of 
outcomes such as care seeking for pre-natal care (number of ANC visits, 
timing of first ANC visit) (Berman, 2015), preventive care seeking 
(testing for HIV) (de Walque et al., 2015), facility delivery (Rob and 
Alam, 2013; Sherry et al., 2017) and immunisation coverage (Matsuoka 
et al., 2014). Positive programme effects on facility-based delivery were 
the most consistently reported in the literature, with less consistent ef-
fects on other indicators. The identified studies provided some level of 
evidence on eight potential demand- and supply-side pathways (i.e. 
mechanisms) through which P4P programmes affect the utilisation of 
health services in LMICs: 1) demand-side strategies including commu-
nity outreach; 2) health worker adherence to clinical guidelines; 3) 
quality of care including patient-provider interaction, and access to 
essential drugs and equipment; 4) provider effort; 5) patient trust; 6) 
Fig. 5. Geographical distribution and number of studies included in the review.  
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facility autonomy, and 7) user fees. It should be noted that some of these 
effects are intermediate, so they affect domains which affect outcomes, i. 
e. they do not affect use directly. For example, availability of drugs af-
fects user fees and trust, which in turn affects demand. Financial au-
tonomy in itself will not affect demand, but it will affect health workers 
ability to deliver services and improve drug supply which will ultimately 
affect demand. 
Several studies suggest that P4P schemes might improve care seeking 
by encouraging providers to invest more time in demand-side strategies 
to achieve incentivised P4P targets (Fig. 3A, Loop R4). For example, a 
qualitative study on the Plan Nacer programme in Argentina found that 
providers taking part in the programme conducted more home-visits to 
encourage pregnant women to seek ante-natal care and that, potentially 
as a result, eligible women sought care 1.5 weeks earlier (Berman, 
2015). An important contextual factor that likely moderates this effect is 
cultural norms about care seeking (Fig. 3A, Note 1). A study in Rwanda 
found that because of health care seeking behaviour of women where 
they generally seek care only in the later stages of pregnancy, the local 
P4P scheme, which did not have a community outreach component to 
address this cultural norm, was unable to stimulate demand for ANC in 
the early stages of pregnancy (Basinga et al., 2011). 
A number of studies suggest that P4P programmes could improve 
care seeking by increasing staff adherence to clinical guidelines (Fig. 3B, 
R8). In a quasi-experimental study in Rwanda, providers participating in 
a P4P scheme incentivising both coverage and quality of care delivered 
higher clinical quality care to pregnant women and children as 
measured by a standardised total quality score (Basinga et al., 2011). 
Facilities receiving P4P incentives also had improved access to skilled 
personnel, medical equipment and drugs (Fig. 3B, R9). However, overall 
levels of provider knowledge (Fig. 3B, N2) and staff capacity (Fig. 3B, 
N3) were identified as a key contextual moderator. For example, evi-
dence from Malawi suggests that provider skills and educational level as 
well as institutional capacity in terms of staffing and other resources 
were at too low a level when the P4P scheme was introduced (McMahon 
et al., 2016), thus limiting programme effects, a finding that is also 
echoed in studies from Uganda (Ssengooba et al., 2012) and Tanzania 
(Chimhutu et al., 2014). 
A small number of studies suggest that P4P schemes can improve 
quality of care by altering patient-provider interaction (Fig. 3C, R6, R7). 
The main mechanism identified is the amount of time providers spend 
with patients (Fig. 3C, R7). A mixed-methods study in Cambodia found 
that providers extended their working hours – thereby giving them more 
time to see patients (Matsuoka et al., 2014). Similarly, in a qualitative 
study in Rwanda a P4P scheme incentivised providers to hire more staff 
– thereby improving the ratio of patients to staff (Kalk et al., 2010). One 
of the contextual factors identified in the literature that likely moderates 
this relationship, is the availability of human resources (Fig. 3C, N3). 
Studies in Malawi (McMahon et al., 2016), Cambodia (Matsuoka et al., 
2014) or Afghanistan (Engineer et al., 2016) found that when the ratio of 
patients to providers is heavily skewed, P4P is unlikely to allow pro-
viders to spend more time with patients. The attitude of providers to-
wards patients was also identified as a mediator of programme effect on 
demand, with greater provider kindness during deliveries being an 
important pathway towards increased facility-based deliveries in 
Tanzania (Anselmi et al., 2017a). 
A change in the availability of drugs and equipment in healthcare 
facilities was one of the mechanisms through which P4P affects quality 
of care in a number of studies. For example, an RCT in Cameroon found 
that the availability of drugs, medical supplies and equipment was 
higher in facilities taking part in the P4P scheme and that vaccination 
coverage and contraceptive use also improved (Fig. 3B, R9) (De Walque 
et al., 2017) as a result of this. However, the literature suggests im-
provements in structural quality are not always associated with 
increased demand for care. One study in Tanzania reported that facilities 
in rural areas were more likely to observe improvements in the avail-
ability of drugs and medical supplies. Other potentially relevant 
contextual factors not explicitly reported on within the literature include 
the financial autonomy of facilities (i.e. to decide how to use funds) and 
broader consultation fees (Fig. 3B, R5). Indeed, it is a priori plausible 
that even in settings where patients’ willingness to pay for care improves 
because of improved structural quality, their ability to pay – and 
therefore the level of care seeking, remain unchanged. Supportive of 
this, a number of studies reported that the effects of the P4P programme 
were greater among wealthier groups with greater ability to pay (Van de 
Poel et al., 2016; Lannes et al., 2016; Bonfrer et al., 2014c). However, it 
is also plausible that if drugs are available at the facility, this can reduce 
the cost of care seeking as it mitigates the purchase of drugs from private 
pharmacies, in such cases the scheme may preferentially benefit poorer 
groups, as was reported in Tanzania (Binyaruka et al., 2015b). There-
fore, programme effects on care seeking, and their distribution across 
socio-economic groups, will depend on financing arrangements, the 
affordability of drugs, and existence and extent of other patient fees. 
Included studies also suggest that P4P schemes could improve care 
seeking by focusing provider effort on specific activities (Fig. 3A, R3, 
R4) and (Fig. 3C R6, R7, R10). For example, a quasi-experimental study 
in Rwanda indicates that because healthcare workers received large 
financial bonuses for jointly testing couples for HIV (US$4.59 per 
couple/partner jointly tested, compared to US$0.92 per new individual 
tested), they focused on this activity, and the number of jointly tested 
couples increased (de Walque et al., 2015). Nonetheless, P4P schemes 
are not always able to focus healthcare worker effort on incentivised 
activities, even when large financial rewards are provided. The type of 
activity that is incentivised together with available staffing levels 
(Fig. 3C, N3) will moderate the programme effect. For example, pro-
viders in Rwanda did not improve performance for time consuming 
activities or those requiring substantial effort, such as the provision of 
modern contraception (Basinga, 2009; Basinga et al., 2011; Basinga 
et al., 2010). The amount of time providers spend recording and veri-
fying data (Fig. 3C, B2) will also impact provider ability to focus on 
incentivised clinical tasks, with a higher administrative burden reducing 
provider response to incentives (Antony et al., 2017; Millar et al., 
2017b). Furthermore, it seems that for delivery care, the level of base-
line performance at the facility can moderate programme effects on 
providers, with greater effects reported in lower performing facilities in 
Tanzania (Binyaruka et al., 2018b). 
Some studies indicate that a potential channel through which P4P 
programmes influence care seeking is by altering the level of patient 
trust (Fig. 3A, R3, R4). A study in Bangladesh found that, because of a 
referral system for complicated deliveries introduced by a local P4P 
scheme, the level of confidence and trust in healthcare providers 
improved among women – thereby increasing demand for facility de-
liveries (Fig. 3A, R3) (Rahman et al., 2017). Similarly, a study conducted 
in Tanzania (Anselmi et al., 2017a) indicates that improved access to 
essential drugs in healthcare facilities (specifically oxytocin), associated 
with the local P4P scheme, might have increased patient trust, though 
this variable was not explicitly measured. 
Some studies indicate that P4P could affect care seeking by 
increasing the financial autonomy of facilities in terms of access to and 
use of funds (Fig. 3B, N4) (Van de Poel et al., 2016; Wilhelm et al., 
2016). For instance, a mixed-methods study in Cambodia found that 
facilities taking part in the P4P scheme were able to independently 
procure medicines, vaccines and consumables (Fig. 3B, R9), which 
improved facilities’ ability to plan ahead and increased immunisation 
coverage (Matsuoka et al., 2014). However, such an increase in facility 
autonomy will likely only influence care seeking in contexts where fa-
cilities have little autonomy at the outset – which is not usually the case 
in higher income settings such as China. In some P4P schemes provider 
autonomy was not sufficiently embedded within the programme design 
which limited programme effects on care seeking. For example, in 
Malawi it was reported that adaptations to the P4P scheme to bolster 
autonomy in relation to procurement and other local priorities could not 
be made. A District Management Officer noted: “… let me tell you, I 
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wanted them to bring us a skeleton [of P4P]. A skeleton and then together we 
would put on some flesh. Build something together. But they came from 
Lilongwe and they brought a prince. He could not be touched, nothing could 
be changed or altered” (Wilhelm et al., 2016). P4P schemes can enhance 
provider autonomy by building in design features to enable this; how-
ever, programme effects and autonomy will be constrained in contexts 
where procurement is centrally organised and local level procurement 
decisions (to various degrees) are not permitted despite the facility 
having a surplus of funds via P4P. 
Finally, several studies suggest that P4P schemes could influence the 
level of care seeking by lowering user fees (Fig. 3B, R5). A study in 
Cameroon found that out-of-pocket spending, particularly on consulta-
tion fees, was lower in facilities taking part in the P4P scheme, and that 
service utilisation increased (De Walque et al., 2017). Similarly, a study 
in Tanzania reported reductions in the probability of paying for delivery 
care, which mediated the programme effect on the rate of institutional 
deliveries (Anselmi et al., 2017a). Furthermore, a study from DRC pro-
vides evidence for two contextual factors moderating programme effect 
on user fees (Renmans et al., 2017): the level of user fees, as if they are 
very low, then P4P is less likely to impact them; and (Renmans et al., 
2016) the level of incentive (i.e. programme design) and extent to which 
it would offset lost revenue from reduced fees, with providers being less 
likely to reduce user fees to achieve targets where incentive payments 
were insufficient to offset the lost user fee revenue from reduced fees 
(Maini et al., 2017). A number of studies introduced user fee removal 
policies alongside P4P, and in such cases programmes would have no 
effect on user fees. Though the introduction of demand side incentives 
such as user fee subsidies or maternity care vouchers can enhance pro-
gramme effects on service coverage (Van de Poel et al., 2016). Although 
there was no evidence of this in our review, the wider literature suggests 
that even where user fees are reduced, effects on demand will be lower 
in remote areas where distance/geographical barriers limit access 
(Ssengooba et al., 2012). 
P4P and patient satisfaction (perceived quality of care). 
Overall, only seven studies offer some level of evidence on the po-
tential effect of P4P programmes on patient satisfaction, i.e. a measure 
of perceived quality of care, of which five studies showed significant 
positive effects (Rob and Alam, 2013; De Walque et al., 2017; Cercone 
et al., 2005; Soeters et al., 2011a; Binyaruka et al., 2018b) and two 
studies reported significant negative effects (Wang et al., 2011; 
Binyaruka et al., 2015b). Patient satisfaction is measured with very little 
consistency across studies – which makes it challenging to compare 
findings between settings. Studies included in this review provide some 
level of evidence on four potential pathways (i.e. mechanisms) through 
which P4P programmes influence patient satisfaction in LMICs: 1) fa-
cility improvements; 2) increased availability of services; 3) user fees, 
and; 4) provider responsiveness. 
Several studies suggest that one of the channels through which P4P 
schemes might affect patient satisfaction is via improvements in facility 
infrastructure, i.e. a measure of structural quality of care. For instance, a 
study using data from an RCT in Cameroon found that the local P4P 
scheme was associated with infrastructural improvements at the facility 
level (Fig. 3B, R12), improved access to drugs and equipment (Fig. 3B, 
R9) as well as an increase in measures of patient satisfaction (De Walque 
et al., 2017). A contextual factor that is frequently highlighted in the 
literature as moderating this mechanism is the quality of infrastructure 
at the start of the P4P intervention. For example, evidence from DRC 
(Soeters et al., 2011b; Huillery and Seban, 2014) indicates that in set-
tings where the quality of facility infrastructure is very poor at the 
outset, potential improvements achieved by P4P schemes are not suffi-
cient to translate into better outcomes. 
The evidence also suggests that P4P schemes could improve patient 
satisfaction by increasing the availability of services. For example, a 
study in Costa Rica found that healthcare facilities taking part in the 
scheme extended their opening hours (Fig. 3C, R7) and offered home 
delivery of medication (Fig. 3C, R10), and that levels of patient 
satisfaction improved in these facilities (Cercone et al., 2005). Never-
theless, none of the studies reviewed examined what exogenous factors 
may or may not have influenced incentivised providers to increase their 
community engagement. 
A number of studies indicated that P4P could improve patient 
satisfaction by reducing out-of-pocket payments (Fig. 3B, R5). For 
example, a study in Cameroon found that P4P facilities had lower user 
fee levels and higher patient satisfaction (De Walque et al., 2017). The 
literature highlights that patients’ perception of the quality of care is an 
important contextual factor moderating the effect of user fees on patient 
satisfaction. For instance, a study in Cambodia found that shortages of 
essential consumables and medicines were prevalent in facilities (Mat-
suoka et al., 2014), and that this reduced programme effect on user fees, 
as patients had to purchase supplies at private pharmacies. They argue 
that such shortages are “important from the service users’ viewpoint since 
they tend to perceive the availability of medical supplies and products to be a 
token of better health services” (p.463) (Matsuoka et al., 2014). As is also 
suggested by the broader literature on patient satisfaction (Christopher 
et al., 2009) patients’ perception of the quality of care provided in fa-
cilities is important for satisfaction. 
Finally, some studies suggested that provider responsiveness is a 
potential channel through which P4P schemes might influence patient 
satisfaction (Fig. 3C, R6, R7). In a before-and-after study in Bangladesh, 
authors claim that in P4P facilities, “service providers were found more 
responsive to the clients and behaved well due to the incentive” (p.9) 
(Rob and Alam, 2013). As with community engagement, none of the 
studies we reviewed reported the existence of contextual moderators nor 
whether other policies external to the programme affected provider 
responsiveness or its perceived effects on patients. 
3.5. P4P and healthcare providers as well as the broader health system 
Of the studies included in the review, 24 papers offer some level of 
evidence on the potential effect of P4P programmes on healthcare pro-
vider motivation and behaviour and the broader health system (Anselmi 
et al., 2017a; Gertler and Giovagnoli, 2014; Bowser et al., 2013; Antony 
et al., 2017; Bertone and Meessen, 2013; Falisse et al., 2012; De Walque 
et al., 2017; Ding et al., 2013; Soeters et al., 2011a; Singh and Masters, 
2017; Aryankhesal et al., 2015; Peabody et al., 2014; Kalk et al., 2010; 
Ngo et al., 2017; Bertone et al., 2016; Binyaruka and Borghi, 2017; 
Chimhutu et al., 2016; Mayumana et al., 2017a; Gormus, 2015; Shen 
et al., 2017; Vergeer and Chansa, 2008; Feldacker et al., 2017; Abdu-
valieva et al., 2016; Agyepong et al., 2014). Studies discussed in this 
section examine a range of outcomes including, provider motivation and 
efficiency and governance, as well as spill-overs on non-incentivised 
activities, and misreporting of information. The mechanisms relevant 
to each of these outcomes are discussed below. 
A small number of studies examined the potential effect of P4P 
schemes on provider productivity, all of which reported significant 
positive results (Meessen et al., 2007a; Bowser et al., 2013; Bertone and 
Meessen, 2013; Cercone et al., 2005; McMahon et al., 2018). Studies 
highlight that one of the potential pathways through which P4P schemes 
might affect provider productivity is by improving provider motivation 
(Fig. 3B, R2, R8). For instance, a qualitative study in Burundi found that 
in P4P facilities, provider motivation improved and providers worked 
“more, more quickly [and] more focused on objectives and priorities” 
(p.853) (Bertone and Meessen, 2013). Similarly, a study in Belize re-
ported that providers working in P4P facilities had significantly higher 
levels of productivity (Fig. 3B, R2), in terms of patients seen per hour 
(Bowser et al., 2013). Identified studies hint towards several programme 
and contextual factors that likely moderate this relationship. Timeliness 
of payments was a key factor underpinning programme effects on pro-
ductivity in Malawi (McMahon et al., 2018) (Fig. 3B, N5). A prolonged 
lag time between reporting and rewarding outcomes likely delinks the 
relationship between rewards and productivity. The extent of payment 
delays will depend on programme factors, such as procedural 
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efficiencies or prolonged counter-verification processes, and contextual 
factors, such as banking infrastructure, system wide transaction block-
ages or donor sluggishness. Although the studies reviewed highlighted a 
number of programme factors involved in timely payments, and claimed 
the importance of timely payments, there was no direct investigation of 
broader contextual moderation on payment delivery. Although there 
was no evidence of this, it is plausible that P4P effects on productivity 
will be greater where schemes incentivise productivity measures such as 
the number of patients seen per hour or the average number of bed days. 
Nine studies examined the potential impact of P4P schemes on pro-
vider motivation, of which four showed significant positive effects 
(Schuster et al., 2018; Bertone et al., 2016; Feldacker et al., 2017; 
Huillery and Seban, 2014), and five showed non-significant effects 
(Schuster et al., 2018; Kalk et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2017; Vergeer and 
Chansa, 2008; Feldacker et al., 2017; Millar et al., 2017b). Studies 
highlighted several potential mechanisms for this. A qualitative study in 
Rwanda suggested that supportive supervision is a potential pathway 
(Kalk et al., 2010) (Fig. 3B, N6). They note that due to increased 
managerial support in P4P facilities, providers perceived positive effects 
on “team spirit”. A study in Mozambique highlights the potential role of 
autonomy as a pathway. They note that the local P4P scheme enabled 
providers to decide how additional funds raised by the P4P scheme 
should be spent (Schuster et al., 2018). Authors note that this “was 
motivating and contributed to workers’ empowerment” (p.640) (Schuster 
et al., 2018). Finally, a study in Zimbabwe underlines the potential 
importance of activity planning as well as income boosts (Fig. 3B, N7) 
(Feldacker et al., 2017). Authors note that the local P4P scheme clearly 
set out roles and responsibilities and gave providers a clear focus in their 
work, which they report was motivational for staff involved in the 
programme. They also indicate that providers perceived the increase in 
their income associated with the P4P scheme as motivational, with one 
respondent stating that “the economic situation these days is just hard. It’s 
difficult for me to get a dollar to buy this or that. The way we work and get the 
incentive actually motivates us because our livelihoods are improved” (p.7) 
(Feldacker et al., 2017). One contextual factor that likely moderates the 
potential of P4P schemes to influence provider motivation is whether 
providers perceive the distribution of P4P bonuses as fair (Fig. 3B, N8) 
(Kalk et al., 2010; Paul et al., 2014). Similarly, implementation con-
straints, such as delays in the disbursement of P4P bonuses which are 
commonly reported (Ssengooba et al., 2012; Antony et al., 2017; Bhat-
nagar and George, 2016; Ogundeji et al., 2016; Bertone et al., 2016; 
Bertone and Witter, 2015; Miller et al., 2014; Bodson et al., 2018), are 
potentially demotivating for providers (Fig. 3B, N5). In addition, how 
providers perceive the targets of P4P schemes likely also plays a role. 
Authors of a study in Rwanda suggest that when indicators are “under-
stood as imposed from outside without knowledge about local contexts and 
needs” this can cause staff dissatisfaction (Kalk et al., 2010). 
Finally, a number of studies examined the effect of P4P schemes on 
governance and accountability (Falisse et al., 2012; Mayumana et al., 
2017b), with reports of improved community participation and external 
accountability (Rudasingwa et al., 2015; Huillery and Seban, 2014). One 
channel through which this potential effect could be achieved is via 
community involvement in the verification process. For example, the 
qualitative study in Burundi, where community-based organisations 
were charged with verification of reported data, reported positive effects 
on community participation in P4P districts (Fig. 3B, N11) (Falisse et al., 
2012). They also find that community-based organisations function 
better in P4P districts, as they conduct more activities and are more 
aware of their mandate. Similarly, a study in Tanzania found that fa-
cilities were more likely to have governing committees, though their 
role was limited as they did not receive P4P bonus payments. The 
Tanzanian scheme also resulted in improvements in internal account-
ability measures, including increased supervision of facilities by district 
managers. One programme design feature that supported this effect was 
the incentivisation of district managers based on the performance of 
facilities in their district (Mayumana et al., 2017b). 
A number of studies provide evidence on the potential negative ef-
fects, or spillovers, of P4P schemes on non-incentivised activities (Cel-
hay et al., 2015; Gertler and Giovagnoli, 2014; De Walque et al., 2017; 
Ngo et al., 2017; Binyaruka et al., 2015b; Feldacker et al., 2017; Zhang 
et al., 2017b). For example, a qualitative study on a P4P scheme focusing 
on male circumcision (MC) found that the perceived quality of other 
services suffered (Fig. 3C, R1) (Feldacker et al., 2017). Specifically, they 
found evidence suggesting that providers prioritised circumcision work 
over their other duties, even if they were more urgent. One respondent 
noted that “For instance, if there is a patient who needs to have a caesarean 
done and at the same time the doctor has to go out for MC, if he remains doing 
the C-section he doesn’t get any incentive for that C-section so he would 
rather go and do MC” (p.10 (Feldacker et al., 2017),). These negative 
spillover effects are also reported in other settings, such as in Argentina, 
where prenatal care utilisation of non-beneficiary populations in clinics 
covered by P4P scheme decreased (Gertler and Giovagnoli, 2014) and in 
Rwanda where resources were shifted away from non-incentivised areas 
(Fig. 3C, R1) (Ngo et al., 2017). A number of programme factors likely 
moderate this mechanism. For example, one might expect that neglect of 
non-incentivised services will be more likely in schemes that reward a 
limited set of activities, as it is easy for providers to identify 
non-incentivised tasks in their daily work. In addition, one might argue 
that providers are more likely to focus on activities that are heavily 
rewarded – although it is unclear at what point a payment becomes “too 
large” in this sense. One contextual factor affecting negative spillover 
effects in Tanzania, was the level of care; with spillover effects being 
more likely at lower level primary care facilities, as they had limited 
staffing to meet demand and thus prioritised incentivised over other 
services (Chimhutu et al., 2014; Gormus, 2015). 
Another common finding in the literature is that P4P schemes 
encourage misreporting of information and gaming (Fig. 3D, R11) 
(Engineer et al., 2016; Aryankhesal et al., 2015; de Walque et al., 2015; 
Kalk et al., 2010). A qualitative study in Iran found that stakeholders 
often misreported information and data to auditors (Aryankhesal et al., 
2015). Similarly, a qualitative study in Rwanda found that “information 
was regularly distorted. Such distortion included the arbitrary and retro-
spective filling of forms” (p.186) (Kalk et al., 2010). They also found ev-
idence for other forms of gaming such as not distributing the last box of a 
given drug to avoid stock-outs (which were disincentivised in the 
scheme) (Fig. 3D, Loop B1). The theoretical rationale for gaming is the 
desire to maximise P4P bonuses. In addition, the aforementioned study 
in Rwanda suggests that providers perceiving some indicators as inap-
propriate or lacking time to “do the job properly” (p.186) likely plays a 
role (Kalk et al., 2010). Evidence from Rwanda also suggests that mis-
reporting could be inherent to P4P as authors note that “some people 
defended the view that such behaviour was incompatible with medical ethics, 
though it was fostered by the P4P approach.” (p.186) (Feldacker et al., 
2017). Several programme design factors were identified in the litera-
ture as being associated with misreporting and gaming within P4P 
schemes (Engineer et al., 2016). Although this was not supported by 
empirical studies within this review, from a theoretical point of view, 
gaming should be more likely in schemes that provide penalties rather 
than rewards (Fig. 3D, N9). This is because of loss-aversion (Kahneman, 
1991), or people’s tendency to feel that the pain of losing is more 
powerful than the pleasure of an equivalent gain. A study in Benin 
(Antony et al., 2017) found that misreporting was more likely to occur 
where there was inadequate verification (Fig. 3D, N10) and in the 
absence of sufficient sanctions for misreporting. Furthermore, mis-
reporting was not always intentional. This sometimes arose due to flaws 
in data reporting systems (Mayumana et al., 2017b), or a lack of human 
resources impacting on the quality and reliability of timely reporting 
(Fig. 3D, N12). 
4. Discussion 
Ours is the first systematic realist review to assess how and why P4P 
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programmes implemented in LMICs result in intended or unintended 
outcomes by exploring the underlying mechanisms and contextual and 
programme design moderators. Although we specifically targeted 
studies that in some way captured the associative mechanisms between 
P4P and relevant outcomes, it is important to note that the general ev-
idence on the potential outcome effects of P4P was mixed and indeter-
minant, which is consistent with other systematic reviews on P4P 
(Witter et al., 2009; Turcotte-Tremblay et al., 2016; Oxman and Fre-
theim, 2009). For example, many of the studies included in this review 
did not find evidence that P4P schemes are consistently associated with 
increased patient demand for healthcare (Engineer et al., 2016; 
Powell-Jackson et al., 2015; Basinga et al., 2011) or with improving 
healthcare provider motivation (Schuster et al., 2016). 
It is also clear that existing P4P studies, as a body of knowledge, 
remain insufficient for coming to a clear determination on a full set of 
pathways and mechanisms, and that variation in study design, pro-
gramme design, implementation and contextual influences makes it 
challenging to make generalisations on P4P in LMICs. That said, the 
review did pinpoint a number of common pathways and contextual 
factors that demonstrated how P4P works in LMIC settings, namely by 
increasing the utilisation of healthcare services, patient satisfaction, 
healthcare provider productivity, and improving governance arrange-
ments. The review also identified pathways to unintended 
consequences. 
In terms of the utilisation of health services in LMICs, common 
pathways that were suggested to affect outcomes included supply-side 
changes including a resource effect: the improved availability of drugs 
and equipment and greater provider effort; and an effect on procedures 
within the organisation: greater adherence to clinical care guidelines, 
improved interactions with patients, and a reduction in user fees 
charged. Facility autonomy around financial management and decision 
making which was reported in some schemes supported these supply 
side changes. Provider initiatives to stimulate demand within the com-
munity, such as outreach activities, were also important. Changes in 
supply and demand side factors resulted in greater patient trust which 
was a further mechanism underpinning demand. We found that P4P 
effects on patient satisfaction in LMICs were driven by improvements in 
the quality of facility infrastructure and the availability of drugs and 
supplies; an increased availability of services and reductions in user fees 
charged increasing the affordability of care, and provider responsive-
ness. The availability of drugs and supplies, and reductions in user fees 
emerged as key mechanisms stimulating both service utilisation and 
patient satisfaction. Lastly, we found that P4P schemes effect on health 
worker productivity was enabled by increased provider motivation and 
that P4P can strengthen internal and external accountability. Unin-
tended consequences such as spillover effects on non-incentivised ac-
tivities and misreporting of information were commonly reported. 
Although these spillovers were not present or reported across all cases, 
reference to these issues as representing a potential problem common to 
P4P was generally noted. 
From our review, it was also possible to identify a number of 
contextual factors that likely moderated the effects of P4P schemes in 
LMICs, either enhancing or undermining the ability of these schemes to 
strengthen the health system. These can be classified as distal factors 
characterising the wider health system; and proximal factors charac-
terising the facility environment within which the P4P scheme was 
introduced and the characteristics of the population served by the fa-
cility. In terms of distal factors, the level of decentralisation of the health 
system was of key importance, as this shapes the degree of financial and 
management autonomy at the facility level and affects the ease of 
equipment and medicine procurement and the extent to which facility 
staff can determine and control the allocation of resources towards local 
priorities and needs. Greater autonomy was associated with stronger 
programme effects on facility resourcing (availability of drugs, supplies 
and equipment) and staff motivation and productivity. A second distal 
factor is the efficiency of the banking system and ease of bonus transfers, 
affecting timeliness of bonus payments; where bonus payments were 
timely this increased motivation and productivity. A third distal factor is 
the financing of public services, and the extent to which this is depen-
dent on user charges: where user charges were higher, P4P was more 
likely to affect demand through a reduction in user charges; however, 
P4P effects on demand were generally higher where user fees were ab-
sent or where concurrent demand side programmes such as insurance or 
voucher schemes were in place as services were more affordable. 
Proximal factors at the facility level include staffing levels, staff 
training, knowledge and motivation levels and the quality of facility 
infrastructure before the programme started. These factors were 
important in shaping the provider response to the programme, as where 
staff levels were higher they could better absorb the additional reporting 
tasks and demand associated with P4P; where skills and motivation were 
higher, staff were more likely to increase adherence to clinical care 
guidelines, resulting in greater patient satisfaction. Conversely where 
resources were limited at the outset, P4P was less likely to overcome 
these constraints and improve outcomes. The risks of unintended con-
sequences such as negative spill-overs and gaming were also higher in 
facilities with more limited staff capacity. 
Proximal factors at the level of the wider community included pre- 
existing social norms about care seeking, which generally constrained 
the ability of P4P programmes to improve demand through outreach 
activities; and geographical access, with user fee effects being attenu-
ated among more remote communities, but rural facilities generally 
performing better under P4P schemes due to lower baseline perfor-
mance levels and more scope for improvement. 
A number of programme design features were also identified within 
the review as supporting health system effects of P4P. In terms of what is 
incentivised, schemes with a wide range of incentivised indicators 
appeared less prone to negative spill-over effects; and tasks requiring a 
lower degree of effort were often prioritised by providers irrespective of 
the associated reward. In terms of who receives the bonus payment, 
ideally everyone who has a role to play in service delivery needs to be 
incentivised to avoid system bottlenecks and bad feeling among those 
who are left out of the incentive system. Incentivising district managers 
and governing committees can enhance the governance function of the 
health system. Fairness in the distribution of bonus payments among 
facility staff, was also important in ensuring the programme motivated 
providers. The use of bonus payments for facility improvements, which 
was a common feature of programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa, was crit-
ical to improving structural quality resulting in better quality care and 
greater patient satisfaction. 
The level of the health worker incentive, and its size in relation to 
health worker income is clearly important in determining programme 
effects, although the review did not allow us to determine minimum 
thresholds. Where the facility incentive was equal or greater than user 
fee revenue, P4P schemes appear more likely to motivate a reduction in 
user fees. 
Auditing of performance data through verification is an important 
feature of programme design. Where verification systems involved 
communities and district managers this increased external and internal 
accountability respectively. The verification system could trigger pay-
ment delays or result in long lag times between reporting and payment, 
which would reduce motivation effects. Strong verification systems 
reduce the risk of misreporting, but where these represent a heavy time 
burden for facility staff, this can result in negative spill-overs. There is 
therefore a need to balance rigour with efficiency in the design of 
verification systems. 
While many of the mechanisms hypothesised in the original theory of 
change were supported by the review, a number were not. This does not 
mean that P4P schemes do not affect these areas, just that these areas 
have been understudied and there is currently a lack of evidence that 
these were mechanisms underpinning programme outcomes. A number 
of new mechanisms were identified, especially around the unintended 
effects of P4P, with penalty systems encouraging providers to retain 
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drugs at facilities and making misreporting of results more likely; and 
the mechanisms underpinning provider motivation, notably the timeli-
ness of payments, fairness in the distribution of incentives and clarity of 
roles. Overall, the review enabled us to build a more nuanced under-
standing of relationships between supply and demand side elements of 
the health system, contextual and programme moderators and outcomes 
using a CLD. 
We found that some of the mechanisms which emerged as key, were 
not obviously linked to the financial incentive component of P4P. For 
example, the increased availability of drugs and supplies, and improved 
facility infrastructure, is a reflection of the ‘resource effect’ of P4P, the 
fact that providers have more revenue. Such results may have been 
achieved by simply increasing facility budgets. The greater autonomy 
due to financial decentralisation and ability to plan and prioritise how 
funds are spent were also important; as was the monitoring and auditing 
of performance. Future research should compare financial incentives to 
these alternative reforms to determine their relative effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness. 
Within the literature reviewed there was often a tendency to conflate 
heterogeneous programme-specific moderators (such as design and/or 
implementation shortcomings) with non-scheme-related contextual 
factors. As a result, it was often difficult to determine what factors 
moderated P4P outcomes. For example, a reported lack of essential 
consumables and medicines could have been a result of multiple factors, 
such as centralised procurement inefficiencies (contextual), a restrictive 
list of medicines available to be purchased locally (P4P design feature or 
contextual political restrictions), insufficient bonus amounts (design), 
and/or cultural beliefs regarding traditional medicines (contextual). 
However, often the reasons for a shortage of consumables and medicines 
was not identified clearly, instead focusing on the fact that P4P per-
formed well or poorly relative to a specific set of facility, quality, or 
medical supply targets. As another example, many of the studies 
reviewed highlighted the moderating effect of low staff numbers sug-
gesting that human resource deficiencies significantly undermined P4P 
performance, as well as facilities being able to ensure sufficient staffing 
to absorb additional demand and tasks associated with data reporting. 
However, it was often not clear whether these staff shortages were due 
to underestimations within the P4P programme design, and/or whether 
staff shortages were a result of broader contextual health system con-
ditions that affected the results of an otherwise well designed P4P 
scheme. Overall, there is a need for better conceptual and methodo-
logical tools to more reliably understand, classify and measure P4P 
pathways and how multifarious heterogeneous and exogenous factors 
influence the performance of P4P schemes. 
Several studies in our review also reported concerns about the 
overall cost-effectiveness of P4P and whether the gains in certain in-
dicators are offset by higher P4P procedural costs (e.g. verification) 
(Ssengooba et al., 2012; Antony et al., 2017; McMahon and De Allegri, 
2016; McMahon et al., 2016; McMahon et al., 2018; Borghi et al., 2015). 
Studies suggested a need to find a balance between rigorous verification 
processes and their practical feasibility and costs in terms of financial 
resources and time, as these funds would otherwise be available for 
other activities including providing funds to providers. For example, a 
study in Tanzania found that managing the P4P programme was the 
most costly component of ongoing implementation and exceeded the 
costs of financial incentives by between 1.7 times (in financial costs) and 
1.9 times (in economic costs) (Borghi et al., 2015). 
Finally, a number of studies also reported concerns of sustainability 
of P4P programmes where investment is less driven by government 
(Ssengooba et al., 2012; Bertone and Meessen, 2013; Matsuoka et al., 
2014; Van de Poel et al., 2016; Borghi et al., 2015; Chimhutu et al., 
2015). Authors of a study in Burundi advocate for using external 
agencies in the short-term to build capacity and coach, especially in 
weak health systems, with a focus on later transitioning to local health 
system actors (Bertone and Meessen, 2013). They argue that “an external 
agency is able to tap into highly qualified national and international expertise 
and, because of its role in the verification, it has at its disposal information on 
facilities’ performance that could help effective coaching” (Bertone and 
Meessen, 2013). However, authors of a study in Uganda note that 
coaching is a powerful enforcement mechanism, and entrusting it to an 
external agency may create a dependency, which could undermine the 
long-term sustainability of P4P interventions and behavioural changes 
(Ssengooba et al., 2012). It was also noted that as local health system 
actors’ capacities are strengthened, reliance on external agencies would 
become counterproductive, as it would create duplication in funda-
mental responsibilities (Bertone and Meessen, 2013). 
There were numerous limitations and weaknesses in the reviewed 
evidence, so the findings should be interpreted with caution and viewed 
in light of these. Evidence in the review is weak in terms of mechanisms, 
though clearly a number of studies do assess health system effects. 
Admittedly, there are also issues with generalisability and design dif-
ferences across schemes. Most of the evidence also examined pro-
gramme effects relation to singular health system pillars or levers and 
only one study examined the overall effects of programmes on the health 
system as a whole, using methodologies grounded in complexity science 
(Borghi and Chalabi, 2017). This lack of research evidence thus high-
lights a significant gap in our understanding of how P4P effects change, 
through which sorts of mechanisms, and under what conditions. 
In addition, very few of the studies included in the review were 
specifically designed to study pathways though which P4P outcomes 
were achieved. While most studies reviewed were able to show that P4P 
is associated with an outcome (e.g. care seeking) as well as with a 
plausible mechanism (e.g. structural quality), very few provided further 
evidence that a particular mechanism was indeed relevant for a specific 
outcome (for example, evidence to suggest that structural quality is a 
channel through which P4P improved care seeking). As much of the 
included evidence in the review is observational and/or qualitative, the 
effects described are not based on experimental or quasi-experimental 
data in most part, hence the review sets out to describe relationships 
rather than attribute causal effects to P4P in the way of a systematic 
review. 
A further limitation of this review relates to our level of confidence 
about the generalisability of the common P4P pathways and moderators. 
Generalisability issues arise because most P4P studies focus on outcomes 
and not specifically on the combination of programme mechanisms and 
contextual influences delivering those outcomes. Where these factors 
are discussed they are often presented as side notes or as bi-product 
findings or explanations to support initial research questions. There-
fore, a level of interpretation by the review team was necessary. Second, 
most studies of P4P in LMICs generally focused on a single country 
programme with specific attention given only to its particular set of 
programme indicators, with little to no discussion of health system ef-
fects. Since each programme has its own unique P4P design and 
implementation mechanisms, it remained difficult to make clear 
comparative determinations on any common set of P4P features. Third, 
each study utilised different theoretical approaches, methodologies, and 
programme areas of focus. As a result, direct comparisons across a set of 
similar programming criteria or programme design and implementation 
features was often not available, thus limiting generalisability. 
Although we used the MMAT tool to assess the quality of included 
studies, we acknowledge the limitation of using quality assessment tools 
designed to assess the quality of studies that were not primarily designed 
to unpack how and why P4P impacts the health system. Accordingly, our 
quality assessment may have over-inflated the quality of certain studies 
that were very well-designed to assess the impact of P4P on a specific 
health outcome (e.g. facility delivery), but not to analyse how and why 
P4P affected the outcome in the specific LMIC context. s. 
Despite its limitations, this is the first study of its kind to conduct a 
realist review to describe and explain how and why P4P initiatives work 
(or fail to work) in different LMIC contexts by exploring the underlying 
programme theories and the interactions between contextual factors, 
programme design, mechanisms of change and outcomes. Furthermore, 
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our review moves away from a static, linear representation of a pro-
gramme theory by drawing on complexity science methodology and a 
CLD to represent the final revised programme theory. Doing so allowed 
us to fully represent the dynamic and complex nature of this interven-
tion and its impact on the health system as a whole, including by being 
able to illustrate non-linear feedback loops and relationships in the CLD 
to further our understanding of how P4P programmes operate in LMIC 
contexts. 
Our synthesis of the current state of the evidence of how and why 
P4P affects health systems to produce varied outcomes in different LMIC 
contexts can inform donors, policymakers and implementers to design 
more effective P4P programmes to strengthen health systems and ach-
ieve sustainable service delivery and health impact and minimise un-
intended effects. Building on our study findings, Fig. 6 presents key 
features underpinning effective P4P programmes in LMICs and poses 20 
key questions to donors, policymakers and evaluators in charge of 
designing or studying P4P programmes in LMICs, with an aim of helping 
this audience to think about important contextual and programme 
design factors that may have an impact on their P4P programme’s 
intended outcomes. 
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